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INTRODUCTION
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.1
The Fourth Amendment provides for “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”2 As with many phrases of the
Constitution, this right has become a font of considerable complexity
as courts have expanded its reach to cover a wealth of interactions
between the government and individuals.3 Perhaps no other set of
interactions better illustrates this complexity than the current laws
and interpretations defining the Fourth Amendment’s application
to electronic forms of communication.4 Despite the prevalence of
electronic communication in the everyday interactions of the
average American,5 the current landscape of statutory authority and
judicial interpretation on the government’s ability to seize electronic
communications can best be described as outdated and disjointed.6
Yet one could hardly fault legislative sloth and judicial trepidation given the breakneck pace that has characterized the last
decade of technological innovation. E-mail has left the laboratories
of college campuses for middle schoolers’ iPhones. In a matter of a
few years, Myspace rose and fell to Facebook’s present dominance.7
Twitter hashtags chart trends in real time. But beyond the pack1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See Meredith N. Garagiola, Note, When the Constable Behaves and the Courts Blunder:
Expanding the Good-Faith Exception in the Wake of Arizona v. Gant, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1285, 1305 (2010).
4. See Darla W. Jackson, Protection of Privacy in the Search and Seizure of E-Mail: Is the
United States Doomed to an Orwellian Future?, 17 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 97, 100-06
(1999).
5. For example, an estimated 247 billion e-mails were sent per day in 2009. Press
Release, The Radicati Grp., Inc., The Radicati Group, Inc. Releases “Email Statistics Report,
2009-2013” (May 6, 2009), available at http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2009/05/e-mail-statistics-report-2009-pr.pdf.
6. Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1375, 1396-97 (2004) (stating that provisions of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) “are
becoming increasingly outdated and difficult to apply”).
7. See Dawn C. Chmielewski & Jessica Guynn, Myspace Layoffs Are Part of Broad
Restructuring, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/12/business/la-fict-myspace-20110112.
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aging—an unending variety of ways that programmers can repack
and reinvent the binary string of ones and zeros that now allows us
to e-mail and video chat—the messages remain the same. People
share news; they gossip. Secrets are told and confidences kept or
broken. This Note stems from the simple belief that if the message
remains the same, the Fourth Amendment should as well. Whether
by letter, telephone, e-mail, or video, the Fourth Amendment should
ensure parity between the mediums that transmit any given message.
Part I begins with a review of the Supreme Court’s early constitutional jurisprudence on the intersection of government surveillance
in communication and the Fourth Amendment. This review is
centered on the Court’s reasoning in Katz v. United States.8 Katz
was the genesis of contemporary thought on Fourth Amendment
protections for the seizure of electronic communications. In Katz,
the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment applied to the
government’s eavesdropping on a telephone call from a public pay
phone, despite the lack of a physical “trespass” by the government.9
The language in Katz stating the Fourth Amendment protects
“people, not places” specifically rejects a property-based approach to
Fourth Amendment analysis.10 Likewise, the Court’s statement that
“what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected,” supports
the notion that the protections of the Fourth Amendment should not
be applied relative to the technology used to communicate the
message.11 In the aftermath of its landmark decision in Katz, the
Court narrowed the potential scope of its language in United States
v. Miller12 and Smith v. Maryland when involving business records
or communications held by a third party.13

8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9. Id. at 351-53.
10. Id. at 351.
11. Id. at 351-52; see infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing technologyneutral language in Katz).
12. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
13. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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Part II interjects Congress’s attempt at statutory guidance via
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).14
Unfortunately, the ECPA’s assortment of procedural hurdles is
based on arbitrary distinctions among content types and ultimately
fails to adhere to the Supreme Court’s guidance in Katz, Miller, and
Smith.15 Given these failings, the ECPA is an outdated framework
in desperate need of meaningful modernization.
Addressing these failures, Part III suggests a simplified approach
that rests upon a content/noncontent distinction. In distinguishing
between content and noncontent, this Note formulates a “transactional relevance” test.16 This test will allow for the evolution of
technology while maintaining parity with the reasonable expectation of privacy test that the Court established in Katz. An
important complement to the transactional relevance test is the
dismissal of the arbitrary distinctions among content under the
Stored Communications Act of the ECPA. The effect of the
transactional relevance test is that warrant-level protections for
content are maintained in accordance with the Supreme Court’s
guidance under Katz without regard to evolving technology.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY FOURTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS
When the Founders adopted the Fourth Amendment in 1791,17
they could not have imagined, much less anticipated, a nation in
which communications could instantaneously move from origin to
destination. Yet this fact should have little moment in resolving the
challenges posed by today’s technology, as the Constitution has
proven to be remarkably adaptive to the passage of time.18 This Part
14. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. The Bill of Rights, consisting of the First Amendment through the Tenth Amendment,
became effective upon ratification by Virginia on December 15, 1791. Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18. For example, the Commerce Clause has proven an expansive tool in dealing with the
exponential economic growth experienced since the nation’s birth. See, e.g., United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-56 (1995). Similarly, the language of the Fourteenth Amendment has
consistently been relied upon to extend the notions of due process and equal protection. See,
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examines the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding Fourth
Amendment protections for well-established communication mediums such as the first class postal letter, the telegraph, and the
telephone. The Court’s analysis of these early mediums merits a
detailed review. Indeed, the cases addressing these “traditional”
mediums establish important Fourth Amendment doctrines that can
be applied through analogy to today’s digital counterparts.19
A. Communication at the Founding: Ex Parte Jackson and the
Protection Afforded to Letters
The only communication medium contemporaneous with the
Fourth Amendment is the letter. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
refers to “papers” when enumerating areas within its scope.20 The
Court first discussed the Fourth Amendment’s protections for
“papers” as a medium for communication by letter in a case from
1877, Ex parte Jackson.21 The Court’s ruling upheld a statute prohibiting the use of the postal system to circulate lottery materials,
but in dictum the Court established the foundations of Fourth
Amendment protections against warrantless searches of communications.22 Writing for the Court, Justice Field stated that “[l]etters
and sealed packages ... are as fully guarded from examination and
inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”23 No law could empower the government, via its postal
inspectors, to violate the protections afforded to the contents of
sealed letters and packages by the Fourth Amendment.24 To inspect
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-85 (1965).
19. Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2112-13 (2009).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
21. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1877); see Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before
the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553,
556-58 (2007).
22. See Desai, supra note 21, at 569.
23. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
24. Id. (“[A]ll regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination
to the great principle embodied in the [F]ourth [A]mendment of the Constitution.”).
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sealed items in transit through the postal system, the government
was required to procure a warrant based upon probable cause.25
The protections for sealed postal mail under Ex parte Jackson
also carried two notable restrictions. First, the Court was clear to
distinguish sealed mail, such as a letter, from mail that was left
open to examination, such as a newspaper or printed pamphlet.26 In
subsequent cases and statutes, this content/envelope distinction
became a dividing line when determining which communications, or
what elements of a communication, the Fourth Amendment protects.27 Second, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment certainly did not prevent an individual who received a package that
contained a prohibited mailing from delivering that package to the
government.28 The recipient of a delivered communication is not
restricted by any Fourth Amendment right of the sender. The termination of a sender’s Fourth Amendment rights as to a delivered
communication in the possession of another forms the underpinnings of the third-party exception.29 Like the envelope/content distinction, expansive use of the third-party doctrine has played a
critical role in distorting the protections afforded to electronic
communications.30
25. Id. Interestingly, although Justice Field’s opinion refers to “papers” as stated in the
Fourth Amendment, constitutional scholars cannot find any evidence that the Framers
intended for letters to be protected from warrantless searches while in the possession of the
Postal Service. See Desai, supra note 21, at 575-77. Desai suggests that the true impetus for
this protection stemmed from the longstanding statutory prohibitions against postal workers
inspecting private correspondence. Id. at 577.
26. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (“[A] distinction is to be made between different kinds
of mail matter,—between what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and
sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to inspection, such as newspapers,
magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be
examined.”).
27. For a detailed discussion of the development of the content/envelope distinction and
its application to electronic communications, see Tokson, supra note 19, at 2113-18, 2123-54.
28. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 735.
29. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.”). Note, however, that in Ex parte
Jackson, a sealed letter did not constitute a “revealed” communication because the third
party—the government via the Postal Service—could not inspect a letter without a warrant.
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
30. See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored EMail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 149.
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B. Communication Evolves: Embracing the Telephone in Katz and
Justice Harlan’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
When the Court decided Ex parte Jackson in 1877, the telegraph
was already widely deployed across the country after having played
a critical role in communication during the Civil War.31 The
Supreme Court never addressed the Fourth Amendment’s extension
to telegraph transmissions,32 instead leaving the issue to Congress
and the lower courts.33
The telephone, as the telegraph’s successor, first drew the Court’s
attention in Olmstead v. United States.34 In Olmstead, federal prohibition officers wiretapped multiple phone lines in order to gather
evidence regarding a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition
Act.35 The officers inserted wiretaps in the phone lines at junctions
outside the conspirators’ property.36 Roy Olmstead, the lead conspirator, and his coconspirators later argued that the wiretap
amounted to search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.37
The Court rejected Olmstead’s argument on multiple grounds.
First, the Court determined that the language of the Fourth
Amendment dictated that a “search is to be of material things.”38 On
this basis, the Court distinguished Ex parte Jackson.39 Second, the
Court reasoned that the “Fourth Amendment is to be construed in
the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure
when it was adopted.”40 Despite the telephone’s existence in the fifty
years preceding Olmstead, a majority of the Court was not prepared
31. DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1978), available at
http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/seipp/seipp-p78-3.pdf.
32. Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 371 (2009).
33. See generally SEIPP, supra note 31, at 30-42 (describing the interplay between
Congress, Western Union, and the lower courts in deciding the privacy of telegraph
messages).
34. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
35. Id. at 456-57.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 455.
38. Id. at 464.
39. Id. The Court also relied on the idea that Congress had monopolized the postal system
and by statute prohibited postal workers from opening letters in their possession for transit.
Id.
40. Id. at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to extend the Fourth Amendment to cover the interception of
electronic signals captured outside one’s property.41
Almost forty years later, the Court revisited its ruling in Katz v.
United States.42 Katz presented a conceptually similar scenario to
Olmstead: the defendant was convicted upon evidence obtained from
an electronic listening and recording device attached to the exterior
of a public pay phone.43 The recording device captured the defendant
transferring wagering information.44 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit had affirmed the conviction based on the property
theory expressed in Olmstead—the State did not physically trespass
in the area occupied by the defendant.45
The Supreme Court’s opinion, however, declined to continue the
property-centric approach used in Olmstead.46 Although Katz acknowledged the importance of the telephone in private communications,47 the Court did not confine its language and analysis to the
telephone booth. From the outset, the Court clarified that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.48

According to the Court, Katz was “surely entitled” to privacy in
the words he transmitted through the pay phone, and thus the
recording of his conversation constituted a search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.49 Despite the importance of the Court’s
holding, the majority’s opinion is sparse on guidance in understanding exactly why Katz was “surely entitled” to assume the privacy of
his conversation. Following Katz, both the Court and scholars have
41. Id.
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
43. Id. at 348.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 348-49.
46. Id. at 351; see Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 19 (2006).
47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
48. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 352.
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looked to Justice Harlan’s concurrence and its two-prong “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.50 Under Justice Harlan’s analysis
of prior decisions, a search and seizure implicates the Fourth
Amendment when “a person [exhibits] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second ... the expectation [is] one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”51
The majority’s holding and Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy test are robust triggers for Fourth Amendment protection. First, the Court’s language is technology-neutral.52 In
contrast to Olmstead,53 there was no examination into the technology used to transmit the message because the Court no longer
considered the Fourth Amendment’s protections limited to physical
objects.54 Second, and in a related sense, Fourth Amendment protection existed even though a telephone service provider acted to
transmit the message.55 In Katz, the telephone provider functioned
as the Postal Service did in Ex parte Jackson, and its role in the
delivery of a communication did not erode the sender’s expectation
of privacy in the communication.56 Despite the Court’s generalized
language, the Court subsequently restrained any overly broad
50. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (noting that Harlan’s test is
expressed in the majority’s opinion as something that an individual “seeks to preserve ... as
private,” which is objectively “justifiable” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353)); Christopher
Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1588, 1591-92 (2010); Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2009). But cf. Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth
Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1382 (2008) (arguing that Justice
Harlan’s test distracted courts and befuddled the concept of “privacy” in the actual holding
of Katz).
51. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 580
(2009) (“[T]elephone calls are protected because of the function they serve rather than the
accident of the technology they use.”). Indeed, Professor Kerr suggests that Katz requires a
technologically neutral approach to the Fourth Amendment. Id.
53. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (“The reasonable view is that one
who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his
voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house and messages while passing
over them are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”).
54. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
55. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 773 (2008).
56. Of course, this privacy is confined to the contents of the communication. As subsequent
cases illustrate, noncontent information, such as the number dialed, is not considered within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. See discussion infra Part I.C (discussing Smith v. United
States and Miller v. United States).
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reading of Katz’s holding through reliance on the third-party
doctrine.57
C. Contents in Context: Business Records and the Third-Party
Doctrine
In Katz, the majority disavowed a strict focus on location or
property and instead chose to focus on the expressed intent of the
individual.58 The Fourth Amendment protects information that an
individual “seeks to preserve as private” and that society recognizes
as reasonably entitled to privacy,59 but information “knowingly
expos[ed] to the public,” regardless of location, is outside the Fourth
Amendment’s scope.60 To be clear, the Court extended Fourth
Amendment protections in Ex parte Jackson and Katz under factual
scenarios that strictly involved the government intercepting the
contents of a private communication.61 Furthermore, in both cases
the communication was in the possession of a third party solely for
its delivery to the intended recipient.62 When faced with noncontent
information and information revealed to a third party in both Miller
and Smith, the Court did not find a protected Fourth Amendment
interest.
In United States v. Miller, the government acquired incriminating
bank records associated with defendant Miller after serving a
subpoena on Miller’s banks.63 The Court provided two reasons for
denying Miller a Fourth Amendment interest in the bank records
turned over due to the subpoena.64 First, the Court found that the
information conveyed was not the “private papers” of the defendant

57. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-45 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442-43 (1976); Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1024-25 (2010).
58. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 351.
61. In subsequent cases, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
transactional business records. See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 440.
62. With respect to the contents of the communication, the third parties—the U.S. Postal
Service and a telephone company—were merely mediums for transmitting the messages. See
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877).
63. 425 U.S. at 437.
64. Kerr, supra note 52, at 569-70.
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but rather constituted a “business record” of the bank.65 An expectation of privacy could not exist with respect to information the
bank used in commercial transactions.66 Second, Miller had revealed
the information to the bank—a third party—in conducting his
finances.67 Justice Powell wrote:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.68

Miller demonstrates the restrictive nature of the objective prong in
Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy test.69 Regardless
of whether Miller exhibited a belief that bank records were private
communications, the Court deemed such an expectation unreasonable based on the records’ transactional contents that Miller revealed in the ordinary course of his business with the bank.70
Three years later, the Court revisited its holding in Miller in the
context of pen registers in Smith v. Maryland.71 The pen register at
issue in Smith employed a surveillance technique distinct from the
wiretap analyzed in Katz.72 The device was installed at the phone
company’s central office and recorded the numbers dialed from
Smith’s line but did not record the contents of any communication

65. Miller, 425 U.S. at 440.
66. Id. at 442 (finding that checks were not “confidential communications”).
67. Id. at 441-43.
68. Id. at 443. Scholars differ on the import of the Court’s holding on this point. Compare
Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 30, at 148 (“[R]eading Miller’s ‘assumption of risk’ approach
broadly creates undue tension with Katz.”), with Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The
Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 104 (2004)
(“[T]he Court asked whether any other person has been given (or has gained) access to the
information the government is seeking to obtain. If the answer is yes, the Court has held that
the area simply is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).
69. See Kerr, supra note 52, at 570-71.
70. See Tokson, supra note 19, at 2156.
71. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
72. “A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone.... It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are
actually completed.” Id. at 736 n.1 (citation omitted).
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on the line.73 As in Katz, the government did not seek a warrant or
court order to install the pen register, and Smith challenged the
search and seizure of his call information as a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.74
Smith’s holding, which denied Fourth Amendment protections to
pen register surveillance, demonstrated the interplay of the Court’s
jurisprudence on Fourth Amendment protections for communications from Ex parte Jackson through Katz and Miller.75 Applying
Katz, the Smith Court recognized the distinction between the contents of the private communications captured in Katz and the
“limited capabilities” of the pen register used in Smith.76 The
Court’s analysis harkened back to the content/envelope distinction
referenced in Ex parte Jackson.77 This distinction also weighed on
the reasonable expectation of privacy test under Katz.78 The Court
found, from a normative view, that a phone company’s routine use
of subscriber phone records rendered any subjective expectation of
privacy for dialed numbers highly unlikely.79 Drawing from Miller,
the Court found that Smith’s privacy expectation was not objectively
reasonable to society.80 As with bank records in Miller, Smith conveyed the numbers he dialed to the phone company in the ordinary
course of his business with the phone company.81 In doing so, Smith
“assumed the risk” that the information he revealed to the telephone company’s equipment would be conveyed to government
authorities.82
The Court’s holding on this basis is of particular importance to
electronic communications such as e-mail or instant messaging.
Smith posited that information conveyed to a third party in the
73. Id. at 737, 741.
74. Id. at 737.
75. See Kerr, supra note 57, at 1023-25.
76. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-42.
77. See Kerr, supra note 57, at 1023-25.
78. See Tokson, supra note 19, at 2155 (“[N]umerous courts and commentators have read
Smith as holding that the content/noncontent distinction is crucial to determining whether
an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
79. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43; see Tokson, supra note 19, at 2156.
80. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-45.
81. Id.; see Tokson, supra note 19, at 2156-57 (stating that Smith implicitly extended the
third-party doctrine discussed in Miller to transactions with third parties in which the
communication was solely intended for another private party).
82. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-45.
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normal course of business was “revealed” regardless of whether that
information was actually conveyed to a person or an electronic
device.83 In this respect, the Court maintained the technologyneutral approach it had adopted in Katz.84 Regardless of the technology, Katz did not inquire into the specifics of the medium used to
transfer the contents of a confidential communication,85 and Miller
and Smith likewise did not afford protection to noncontent information revealed to a third party in the normal course of its business,
even when that information is revealed solely to electronic, automated systems.86 Shifting from Supreme Court precedent to
statutory authority, Part II will discuss how Congress has muddied
the constitutional waters by enacting legislation governing electronic communications that largely ignores the holdings of Katz and
its progeny.
II. CONGRESS INTERVENES: THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
PROTECTION ACT
The ECPA currently provides the statutory framework for
government surveillance of all electronic communications—from
telephone wiretaps and pen registers to e-mail and today’s emerging
technologies.87 Congress enacted the ECPA as an amendment to
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
the original Wiretap Act.88 The ECPA restructured the original
Wiretap Act, which protected only voice communications from
interception, into three parts.89 Title I of the ECPA contains the
updated Federal Wiretap Act, which encompasses the interception
of wire, oral, and electronic communications.90 Title II, the Stored
Communications Act, outlines the protections afforded to informa83. See id. at 744; see also Tokson, supra note 19, at 2157. When addressing Smith’s
applicability to Internet communications, Tokson criticizes the Court’s “overlapping
rationales” as failing to identify which basis was central to the Court’s holding. Id. at 2156-57.
84. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
85. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
86. See Kerr, supra note 52, at 570; Tokson, supra note 19, at 2157.
87. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see Tokson, supra note 19, at 2117-18.
88. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197; see S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968).
89. See Katherine A. Oyama, Note, E-Mail Privacy After United States v. Councilman:
Legislative Options for Amending ECPA, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 499, 499 (2006).
90. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006); see Oyama, supra note 89, at 499.
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tion in electronic storage and transactional records related to this
information.91 Title III contains the Pen Register Act, which covers
any “device or process” used to capture noncontent information
concerning the “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling” of an electronic communication.92
Part I of this Note addressed the constitutional guidance that
existed at the enactment of the ECPA. Part II now provides a brief
synopsis of the relevant sections of the ECPA, particularly the
Stored Communications Act. Congress itself has recognized the need
for reforming the ECPA, for these statutes were enacted at a time
when no one could have anticipated the evolution of communication
possibilities via the Internet and mobile broadband.93 In short, the
ECPA offers a myriad of procedural requirements and degrees of
protection for different forms and elements of electronic communications.94 The provisions of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) are
particularly significant. As opposed to the heightened protections
that the Wiretap Act affords to the interception of a comprehensive
range of communications, the SCA creates arbitrary distinctions
that do not align with current communication mediums and dataretention practices.95
A. The Federal Wiretap Act
Congress expanded the scope of the Federal Wiretap Act under
Title I of the ECPA to recognize the alternative means by which
electronic communications might be intercepted.96 The Act makes it
illegal to “intentionally intercept[ ] ... any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.”97 To this end, “intercept” is described as the
“acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communi91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712; see Oyama, supra note 89, at 499.
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127; see Tokson, supra note 19, at 2120 (describing the history of
the Pen Register Act and its amendment by the USA PATRIOT Act); Oyama, supra note 89,
at 499.
93. See infra Part III (describing the recent congressional hearings on reforming the
ECPA).
94. See Sarah Salter, Storage and Privacy in the Cloud: Enduring Access to Ephemeral
Messages, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 365, 367-68 (2010).
95. See Tokson, supra note 19, at 2121.
96. See Salter, supra note 94, at 373.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
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cation through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”98 The Act’s definitions function to provide broad coverage for
the content of any conceivable form of electronic communication
while in transit.99 The Wiretap Act, however, will apply to only
interception that is contemporaneous with transmission.100
In e-mail and other current electronic communication technologies, however, storage is practically simultaneous with transmission.101 Under the current ECPA framework, the courts and scholars
remain confused as to the proper boundaries of the Wiretap Act
and the SCA for e-mail and other similar communications that are
“stored” incidental to their transmission at multiple locations before
the communication reaches its intended destination.102 Given the
changes proposed in Part III, it is both beyond the scope of this Note
and unnecessary to thoroughly document the morass that currently
exists in determining whether an e-mail is in storage or in transit
as the communication travels along the Internet’s electronic
pathways.103 For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to assume
that the seizure of an e-mail that has reached its destination is
classified as “electronic storage” and would invoke the SCA rather
than the Wiretap Act.104 Viewed from the perspective of government
surveillance, the Wiretap Act is a prospective investigation tool.105
When the government obtains an electronic wiretap, it seeks the
seizure of real-time transmissions that have not reached their final

98. Id. § 2510(4).
99. Salter, supra note 94, at 371 (discussing protections “applicable to wiretap
surveillance of communications in transmission” as opposed to stored communications).
100. Tokson, supra note 19, at 2119.
101. See Salter, supra note 94, at 382-93 (documenting the guiding case law on the issue
of when an electronic communication is considered stored or in transmission under the
ECPA).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 382.
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2006) (defining “electronic storage” as communications
stored incidental to communication and “any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication”).
105. See Paul K. Ohm, Parallel-Effect Statutes and E-Mail "Warrants": Reframing the
Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1600 (2004) (“[A] classic
substantive distinction in the law is that Title III, the Wiretap Act, governs prospective
surveillance, meaning the contemporaneous interception of electronic communications, while
the SCA governs access to static, historical information.” (footnotes omitted)).
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destinations because at the time the government seeks a wiretap
order, these transmissions do not yet exist.106
Because a wiretap allows the government access to the contents
of all prospective communications, it carries the highest level of protection among electronic communication surveillance techniques.107
To legally impose a wiretap, the government must obtain what is
known as a “super” warrant.108 The requirements of a super warrant
exceed those of a traditional lawful search and seizure.109 In order
to issue a wiretap order, a judge must find, upon a sworn statement
of facts from a law enforcement officer, the following:
(a) [T]here is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular
offense enumerated in [the Wiretap Act];
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such
interception; [and]
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have
failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or
to be too dangerous.110

In addition to these heightened requirements for obtaining a
wiretap order, the Act also provides a comprehensive suppression
remedy for evidence seized under an unlawful wiretap.111 The
Wiretap Act sets the current maximum for protections afforded to
the contents of electronic communications and therefore offers a
proper starting point for assessing the treatment of stored electronic
communications under the SCA.112

106. Because the relevant evidence has not been transmitted, government agents will need
to perform, at the minimum, a cursory examination of all incoming communications to
determine their potential relevance.
107. See Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 287, 290 (2008).
108. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2003).
109. See Salter, supra note 94, at 373.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1), (3) (2006).
111. See Salter, supra note 94, at 375-76. The SCA lacks an equivalent suppression remedy
for criminal proceedings. Id.
112. See Tokson, supra note 19, at 2121.
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B. The Stored Communication Act
In contrast to the prospective nature of a wiretap, government
surveillance by means of seizing communications under the SCA
implies that these communications already exist in electronic storage at a given location, regardless of whether that location represents the messages’ final destination. Seizure pursuant to the
SCA is retrospective in the nature of the contents seized under
the statute.113 The SCA governs the accessibility of “stored wire
and electronic communications and transactional records.”114
Subchapters of the SCA include prohibitions against unauthorized
access of electronic communications115 as well as restraints on a
storage provider’s ability to disclose the contents of its users’ communications.116 For government surveillance purposes, however, the
principal provision of the SCA is 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which provides
the procedures through which a government entity may require the
disclosure by service providers of stored communications and
transactional records.117
Section 2703 subdivides the compelled disclosure of stored communications and transactional records into a procedural hierarchy
that results in varying levels of protection.118 Subsection (a) first
operates to distinguish between the content of messages in electronic storage for 180 days or less and messages stored for more
than 180 days.119 Among these types of content, the former is afforded ordinary probable cause warrant-level protection, as opposed
to the “super” requirements for a wiretap.120 The latter, however,
only requires one of the three available options in subsection (b): a
search warrant as in subsection (a); an administrative subpoena; or

113. The operative word here is contents. Certainly, the noncontent information recorded
by electronic pen registers is prospective in nature. See In re United States for an Order:
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Tap & Trace Device, 622 F. Supp. 2d
411, 413 (S.D. Tex. 2007); see also Tokson, supra note 19, at 2118-21.
114. 18 U.S.C. ch. 121.
115. Id. § 2701.
116. Id. § 2702.
117. Id. § 2703; see Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007) (ordering rehearing en banc).
118. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 30, at 126-27.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
120. See Warshak, 490 F.3d at 461-62.
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a court order.121 If the government obtains a warrant, it does not
have to provide notice to the user whose communications are
disclosed,122 but prior notice is required for an administrative
subpoena or court order.123
The notice distinction is premised on the lesser standard required
to obtain an administrative subpoena or court order.124 A court order
merely requires “specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that ... [the communications or
records] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”125 This is a lesser standard than probable cause.126 In addition,
the requirement that the notice be “prior” notice is not absolute.
Under § 2705, notice may be delayed by up to ninety days if the
government can demonstrate that notice would have an “adverse
result.”127 In effect, § 2703 operates to allow the government to
obtain the content of any e-mail stored by a service provider for
more than 180 days and to delay notice of this government action
without ever requiring a showing of probable cause—the standard
explicitly set forth in the Fourth Amendment.128
When the government seeks noncontent information, the SCA
sets procedural requirements at a bare minimum.129 Under
§ 2703(c), the government may obtain the following user information
with a subpoena:
(2) A provider of electronic communication service or remote
computing service shall disclose to a governmental entity the—
(A) name;
(B) address;

121. Id. at 462; see 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
123. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B).
124. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 30, at 127-28.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
126. See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2007).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(A). An “adverse result” may be any of the following: “(A)
endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C)
destruction of or tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E)
otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.” Id. §
2705(a)(2)(A)-(E). In addition, the government may obtain an additional ninety-day extension
if it can demonstrate the continued potential for an adverse result. Id. § 2705(a)(1)(A).
128. See id. § 2703.
129. Tokson, supra note 19, at 2122.

2012]

KATZ CRADLE

1815

(C) local and long distance telephone connection records,
or records of session times and durations;
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of
service utilized;
(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber
number or identity, including any temporarily assigned
network address; and
(F) means and source of payment for such service
(including any credit card or bank account number).130

Furthermore, the government is not required to provide notice to
the subscriber when someone requests this information.131 Outside
of the enumerated items above, the government may request any
other noncontent records through a court order under § 2703(d) or
a warrant.132 An example of this type of record for electronic communications is the header information from e-mails.133 Again, notice
is not required.134
III. RESTORING PARITY: A TECHNOLOGY-NEUTRAL APPROACH FOR
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH KATZ,
MILLER, AND SMITH
It is hardly novel to suggest that the ECPA, and the courts’ application of Fourth Amendment principles to electronic communications, demand reform. In May 2010, the House of Representatives’s
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties
began a series of hearings focused on reforms to the ECPA.135
Representative Nadler, Chairman of the Subcommittee, posed the
following question to the panel of experts who testified at the
hearing: “[I]n what ways have ... [recent technologies] potentially
subverted one of the original and central goals of [the] ECPA, which
was to preserve ‘a fair balance between the privacy expectations of
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)(A)-(F).
131. Id. § 2703(c)(3).
132. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(B).
133. Tokson, supra note 19, at 2122. The header of an e-mail contains the routing information for the message. See id. at 2127.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(3).
135. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
1 (2010) [hereinafter ECPA Hearing].
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citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement?’”136 These
hearings signify that Congress is aware of the pressing need to
revisit a body of statutory law that was designed for a “technological environment as far removed from our own as that of 1986
was from the day Alexander Graham Bell said, ‘Mr. Watson, come
here. I need you.’ in the first telephone call 110 years earlier.”137
Accordingly, the relevant issue is not the need for reform, but rather
the shape these reforms should take. This Note argues that the
overall objective should be a statutory framework that allows courts
to apply the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Katz, Miller, and
Smith without regard to the medium or technology used to effectuate the message. In essence, the ECPA’s successor should ensure
Fourth Amendment parity between the telephone and all other
communication mediums.
In shaping the following recommendations, insistence on simplicity is paramount. This insistence conforms with the Supreme
Court’s guidance on the Fourth Amendment and benefits all parties
involved—courts, citizens, and law enforcement.138 First, a simple
framework, devoid of complex distinctions and protection hierarchies, will allow for consistent and efficient application by the
federal judges who must review law enforcement requests for wiretaps and compelled disclosures on a daily basis in an ever-changing
technological landscape.139 Second, simple guidelines are more likely
to conform with the subjective prong of the reasonable expectation
of privacy test because the subjective privacy expectations of
citizens are more likely to align with a statutory framework that
avoids arbitrary distinctions.140 Third, law enforcement officers will
136. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler).
137. Id. at 1.
138. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681-82 (1988) (describing the virtues of brightline rules that provide “clear and unequivocal” guidelines to law enforcement (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1984) (“This Court
repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad
hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual
circumstances. The ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman to discern
the scope of his authority; it also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily
and inequitably enforced.” (citations omitted)).
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (requiring a federal judge to grant an order authorizing the
use of a wiretap).
140. For example, the SCA affords considerably less protection to e-mails that are stored
for more than 180 days. See id. § 2703(a). Presently, Google’s Internet-based e-mail service,
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be less likely to unintentionally violate clear and consistent
guidelines.141
A. The Transactional Relevance Test: A Technology-Neutral
Definition for Noncontent
In Ex parte Jackson, the Court distinguished between the
contents of a sealed letter and the exposed information visible on its
envelope.142 When faced with the interception of the contents of a
telephone communication in Katz, the Court declared that “what [a
person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”143 Subsequently in
Miller and Smith, the Court clarified that the Fourth Amendment
would not apply to transactional information, such as bank records
and dialed telephone numbers, revealed to a third party in the
ordinary course of business.144 This line of cases supports a distinction in Fourth Amendment protections between content and noncontent information.145
In accordance with this distinction, the seizure of communication
content should require a probable cause search warrant regardless
of the technology. Noncontent information may be obtained by a
lesser standard, such as a subpoena or court order.146 This framework has gained widespread approval among scholars and technol-

Gmail, offers users over seven gigabytes of free e-mail storage and suggests that users archive
rather than delete messages. See Gmail Help Center, Archiving vs. Deleting?, GOOGLE,
http://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=32608 (last updated Dec. 7,
2011). As a result, Gmail users are highly unlikely to harbor a different expectation of privacy
for their older messages as opposed to more recent e-mails. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note
30, at 162.
141. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681-82.
142. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
143. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
144. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442 (1976).
145. See, e.g., Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 30, at 173 (advocating for a content/noncontent
distinction); Kerr, supra note 57, at 1018 (advocating again for a content/noncontent
distinction); Tokson, supra note 19, at 2112 (“[T]he distinction is firmly established in
communications surveillance law.”).
146. See, e.g., Kerr supra note 57, at 1018 (“[N]on-content information should not trigger
the Fourth Amendment.”).
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ogy professionals.147 Yet this proposal says very little, for the crux
of this argument is really about how one defines content and,
inversely, noncontent. As the following discussion demonstrates,
scholars’ views on this issue are wide-ranging.148 Drawing from this
pool of arguments and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, this Note
proposes a new “transactional relevance” test for separating content
from noncontent across all communication mediums—present and
future.
Given the present statutory morass, several notable scholars have
attempted to devise a suitable model for understanding the Fourth
Amendment in a digital world. Renowned Fourth Amendment
scholar Orin S. Kerr, for instance, crafted a definition for content
and noncontent via analogy to the physical world and an inside/
outside distinction.149 Professor Kerr argued that in the physical
world, activities that occur “out in the open” are exposed to the
public and government surveillance.150 In contrast, activities in enclosed spaces are not visible to the public, and government surveillance of these inside activities requires a search warrant.151 In the
electronic world, the content/noncontent distinction must “mirror
the traditional distinction between inside and outside.”152 In a world
without any means of communication other than face-to-face conversation, the identities, location, and time of communication would
147. See, e.g., ECPA Hearing, supra note 135, at 34-35. At the House of Representatives’s
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties’s first hearing on ECPA
reform, every witness supported a content/noncontent distinction. See id. at 18 (statement of
James X. Dempsey, Vice President for Public Policy, Center for Democracy and Technology)
(“Congress should extend the traditional warrant standard to our personal communications,
private documents and highly sensitive information like mobile hacking data. Other less
sensitive data should be available with a subpoena.”); id. at 33 (statement of Albert Gidari)
(“Service providers want clarity and bright line rules.”); id. at 34 (statement of Orin S. Kerr,
Professor, The George Washington University School of Law) (“[I]t may be helpful to think
about two different kinds of data that communication providers may have. One category is
content communication.... And then there is lots of non-content information.”); id. at 55
(statement of Annmarie Levins, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft) (“I think that in fact
if you are talking about content, people expect that what they would have on their hard drive,
and in their personal hard drive, should be protected in the same way.”). But see Slobogin,
supra note 50, at 1588 (arguing that Fourth Amendment protections “ought to be roughly
proportionate to the invasiveness of the search”).
148. See infra text accompanying notes 149-62.
149. Kerr, supra note 57, at 1009.
150. Id. at 1010.
151. Id. at 1010-11.
152. Id. at 1009.
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be public information.153 This is outside information. However,
assuming the conversation was not “out in the open,” the content of
the conversation would be inside information.154 By analogy, in an
electronic world, the Fourth Amendment would not protect the
users’ identities and logs of their messages, but it would protect the
contents of their confidential communications.155
Kerr’s analogy boasts a logical appeal, but it ultimately lacks
practical usefulness. Kerr admits that an inside/outside analogy
fails to give concrete answers as to what constitutes noncontent in
electronic communications.156 Although the analogy is technologyneutral in its application,157 judges applying such an analogy will
likely arrive at inconsistent conclusions. It would certainly be a
difficult task, for instance, to find a physical world analogy for
metadata.158
In contrast to Kerr’s analogy, Professor Tokson crafts a definition
for content that “focuses on the semantic and/or common law
definition of ‘content,’ presumably the relevant definition for the
word as it is used in Smith.”159 Tokson suggests that the Court’s
opinion in Smith referred to “content” as defined by the Wiretap
Act.160 And under the Wiretap Act, content encompasses “any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication.”161 Tokson finds this to be a broad definition, one
that would encompass “URLs and other content-revealing routing
information.”162

153. See id. at 1018.
154. See id. at 1010, 1020.
155. Id. at 1021.
156. Id. at 1029 (“Every different Internet application generates its own data, and lines
must be drawn to distinguish content from noncontent for each.”).
157. Id. at 1015.
158. Metadata may be defined as “data that provides information about or documentation
of other data managed within an application or environment.” Adam K. Israel, Note, To Scrub
or Not to Scrub: The Ethical Implications of Metadata and Electronic Data Creation,
Exchange, and Discovery, 60 ALA. L. REV. 469, 472 (2009) (citation omitted).
159. Tokson, supra note 19, at 2125.
160. Id. at 2126 (relying on Smith’s use of a prior decision that discussed how pen registers
do not reveal the “purport” of telephone conversations).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006).
162. Tokson, supra note 19, at 2170.
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Tokson’s definition is certainly practical.163 Its adherence to
Smith, however, is questionable due to its finding that content
includes “URLs and other content-revealing routing information.”164
Recall that Smith determined that dialed telephone numbers
captured by a pen register were not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.165 The Court stated that the “petitioner voluntarily
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course
of business .... The switching equipment that processed those
numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in
an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber.”166 The
Court explicitly stated that automation of the switchboard did not
affect its constitutional analysis.167
Based on this language, a URL is simply the Internet’s equivalent
of a phone number. No constitutional difference should exist between a URL that contains words relating to the content of a
website visited and the scenario of a telephone user who asks the
operator to connect him to the town doctor. Both convey information
for the use of the third party in its ordinary course of business. The
only difference is automation, a distinction that Smith rejects.
As an alternative to the distinctions offered by Kerr and Tokson,
this Note suggests a “transactional relevance” test for distinguishing
between content and noncontent. This test asks whether the information a user submitted is relevant to the transaction with the third
party in its ordinary course of business. In other words, would
different information alter the transaction from the third party’s
point of view? If so, the information is not content.
In a straightforward example, consider the body of an e-mail
message. From the perspective of the third-party service provider,
the substance of the information contained in the body of an e-mail
is entirely irrelevant. The service provider merely transmits this
information to its intended recipient.168 A user could alter every
163. Tokson applies this definition to various elements of electronic communications. See
id. at 2127-39 (applying the broad definition of content to URLs and search terms).
164. See id. at 2170.
165. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
166. Id. at 744.
167. Id. at 745.
168. This example is straightforward only to the extent that it is simplistic. Whether a
message says “Hello” or “Goodbye” should be of no relevance to the service provider in
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single character in the message, and the transaction would remain
entirely unaltered from the perspective of the service provider.169
Likewise, the subject field of an e-mail is content. In a more difficult
example, consider the case of a content-revealing URL such as
http://law.wm.edu/academics/gradingpolicy. This address certainly
reveals some degree of the substantive content of the website. As
discussed supra, Tokson would consider this URL to constitute
content, and the government would thus need a warrant in order to
access records showing that the user accessed this link under his
framework.170 The transactional relevance test, on the other hand,
would unquestionably label this information as noncontent. Altering
the URL would certainly change the transaction from the service
provider’s perspective, just as dialing a different number or asking
to connect to a different person would make a material difference to
a switchboard operator.
Using the transactional relevance test provides multiple benefits.
First, it renders the analysis entirely technology-neutral. Regardless
of future developments in communication technology, the question
remains the same: Does the information alter the transaction from
the third party’s perspective? With good reason, Professor Kerr considers a technology-neutral solution vital for adapting the Fourth
Amendment to electronic communications.171 Unlike the inside/outside analogy, however, the transactional relevance test avoids
requiring judges to mentally transport an iPhone back to the
Founding. Most importantly, the transactional relevance test maintains parity between electronic communications and the Court’s
jurisprudence in Katz, Miller, and Smith. The test answers Katz’s
question of whether information has been “knowingly expose[d] to
the public” in accordance with the Court’s guidance in Miller and

completing the transaction. But more complex, real-world scenarios could complicate the
matter. For example, the size of the message—an attribute affected by the message’s
content—is likely relevant to the transaction. This reality, however, should not convert a
message’s content into part of the transaction. The content of a two-page letter inside an
envelope is just as safe as that of a single-page letter.
169. Note that any obligation that a service provider may have to scan messages for illegal
content is outside the bounds of the transactional relevance test.
170. See Tokson, supra note 19, at 2170.
171. See Kerr, supra note 57, at 1015-17.
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Smith.172 A broader definition for content would actually, and
arbitrarily, provide greater protection for an e-mail than a letter.
B. Assigning Protections Under the Transactional Relevance Test
Even with the proper distinction between content and noncontent,
the transactional relevance test must resolve the issue of assigning
protections. In accordance with Katz, content information would
require a probable cause search warrant.173 Unlike the current
provisions of the SCA, this protection would apply for all content,
transmitted under any medium, stored for any length of time.174 The
notice provisions of § 2703(b) would therefore be rendered irrelevant.175 Following Smith and Miller, noncontent information would
exist outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment, and the
government could obtain this information by means of a subpoena
or court order.176 Notice would not be required.
The transactional relevance test would have little practical effect
on the wiretap and its “super” warrant requirement. As a prospective surveillance tool, the Wiretap Act already encompasses the
interception of contents from any conceivable electronic communication technology.177 Rather, the transactional relevance test would
ensure that the retrospective surveillance of the contents of any
electronic communication medium would require a showing of
probable cause.
CONCLUSION
By aligning warrant-level protections with the contents of stored
electronic communications as determined by the transactional
172. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
173. See id. at 352, 358-59.
174. Even under the existing statutory framework, the distinction created by § 2703(b) is
likely unconstitutional. See Kerr, supra note 57, at 1043-44 (“In the routine case, however,
§ 2703(b) is unconstitutional.”).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2006).
176. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (holding that “pen registers did not
acquire the contents of communications,” and therefore were not protected under the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1976) (noting that the
subpoenaed papers were business papers of the bank, not private papers, making the
subpoena valid).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
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relevance test, Fourth Amendment protections can be maintained
in accordance with the Supreme Court’s guidance under Katz
without regard to the evolving technological mechanisms we use to
communicate. This approach adheres to the technology-neutral
language implicit in the holdings of Katz and Smith.178 Furthermore,
parity premised on constitutional doctrine ensures that the objective
side of Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectations test neither lags
nor outpaces the current technological landscape.
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